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THE CASE FOR (AND AGAINST) COMPULSORY 
COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION IN HONG KONG 
 
BY GARY MEGGITT 
FACULTY OF LAW, THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1970s widespread dissatisfaction with the perceived cost, delays and 
complexity of litigation has resulted in the growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(“ADR”)1. Whilst the progress of ADR has been more marked in common law 
jurisdictions than in their civil law counterparts, both have witnessed this aspect of the 
“third wave” of legal reform2. It is widely acknowledged that mediation is the most 
common form of ADR in use and it is credited with enabling parties to settle disputes of 
all shapes and sizes.  
 
Yet, despite sharing the litigation problems of other jurisdictions, Hong Kong has not 
seen a comparable growth in the use of mediation. Mr Wong Yan Lung SC, the Hong 
Kong Secretary for Justice, acknowledged this in November 2007 3 - 
 
“…in his policy address delivered in October, our Chief Executive pledged to 
develop mediation services in Hong Kong. Mediation has been in use in Hong 
Kong for some time. But it is fair to say its application is still relatively narrow” 
 
It is also fair to say that the Hong Kong government, judiciary, legal profession and 
business community are now conscious of the need to promote mediation. The Chief 
Executive’s policy address4, together with speeches by the Secretary for Justice and 
Chief Justice Li – most significantly at the Ceremonial Opening of the Legal Year 20085 
- demonstrate a desire to “catch up” with other jurisdictions. The most concrete evidence 
of this desire is the creation of a cross-sector working group on mediation6.  
 
                                                 
1The National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (the 
“Pound Conference”) in April 1976 addressed the perceived inefficiency and unfairness of the US courts. It 
is widely seen – at least in the US – as the start of the ADR “movement”. Similar conferences in other 
jurisdictions at the same time reached similar conclusions about their courts. 
2 M. Cappelletti and B. Garth (eds.), Access to Justice: A World Survey, Vol. I, Milan, 1978. The “first 
wave” in the growth of “access to justice” was public funding for poorer litigants i.e. legal aid. The second 
included class (multi-party) actions and public interest litigation. The third wave included (or includes) the 
development of less adversarial and less formal means of dispute resolution 
3 At the “Mediation in Hong Kong: The Way Forward” conference. See http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/  
4 See http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/07-08/eng/policy.html  “A New Direction for Hong Kong” at 
paragraph 85. 
5 See http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/2008/sj20080114e.pdf for the Secretary of Justice’s speech and 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200801/14/P200801140146.htm for the Chief Justice’s speech 
6 The Secretary for Justice indicated that the Working Group would hold its first meeting in February 2008. 
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The question, of course, is how to promote mediation. One of the most problematic 
aspects of this question is that of compulsory (or mandatory) court-annexed mediation. 
The Secretary for Justice identified this very issue in his November speech -  
 
“…some are convinced that voluntary take-up of invitations to engage in 
mediation is not effective and there must be certain degree of judicial compulsion 
to ensure mediation will take off, as we have heard this morning. However, there 
are also others who believe that willingness to participate in mediation is critical 
to its success and thus the emphasis should be placed on facilitation, education 
and encouragement” 
 
This paper examines the development of mediation in Hong Kong to date before turning 
to the approach of several other common law jurisdictions to compulsory mediation. It 
then examines the advantages and disadvantages of compulsion and concludes with what 
lessons, if any, the Hong Kong experience may have for other jurisdictions. 
 
1. THE OPTIONS FOR MEDIATION IN HONG KONG 
 
1.1 What is court-annexed mediation? 
 
“Mediation” and “conciliation” have been used to describe both the same and different 
processes, which has often led to confusion. The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation7 states –  
 
“For the purposes of this Law, “conciliation” means a process, whether referred to 
by the expression conciliation, mediation or an expression of similar import, 
whereby parties request a third person or persons (“the conciliator”) to assist them 
in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute arising out of or 
relating to a contractual or other legal relationship. The conciliator does not have 
the authority to impose upon the parties a solution to the dispute” 
 
Similarly, the Interim Report and Consultative Paper (the “Interim Report”)8 of the Chief 
Justice’s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong (“CJR”) commented 
“Conciliation is generally considered to be the same as mediation”9. 
 
Some have observed that the term “conciliation” is used in civil jurisdictions whilst the 
Anglo-American preference is for “mediation” (with “conciliation” being used when the 
“third person” has an advisory or evaluative role10). The Centre for Effective Dispute 
Resolution (“CEDR”) in the UK holds that –  
 
“Mediation is a flexible process conducted confidentially in which a neutral 
person actively assists parties in working towards a negotiated agreement of a 
                                                 
7 See http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc/ml-conc-e.pdf  
8 See http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk/ir/index.html (published in November 2001) 
9 Interim Report (IR) page 234, paragraph 627.3 
10Alexander N (ed) Global Trends in Mediation, chapter 1, page 2 
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dispute or difference, with the parties in ultimate control of the decision to settle 
and the terms of resolution”11 
 
The USA’s CPR Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“the CPR Institute”) 
maintains “Mediation is a process in which a third party neutral - a mediator - sits down 
with the disputing parties and actively assists them in reaching a settlement”12. For the 
sake of simplicity, this paper will adopt the Anglo-American usage of “mediation” and 
will do so to refer to the “non-evaluative” process (unless stated otherwise). 
 
By “court-annexed”, this paper means mediation which is directed, encouraged or 
promoted by the courts in the context of anticipated or ongoing litigation. “Private” 
mediation is instigated by the parties on their own initiative, possibly under a dispute 
resolution clause in a contract or by an agreement to mediate once a dispute arises. It is, 
of course, entirely possible for such “private” agreements to become the subject of 
litigation themselves, not least on their enforceability13. This paper acknowledges the 
importance of such “private” arrangements but will focus on court-annexed processes. 
 
1.2 Mediation in Hong Kong to date 
 
It would be very wrong to suggest that Hong Kong has made no progress in the 
development of mediation. On the contrary, mediation has a long and distinguished role 
in Chinese culture and society14. What is true, however, is that “modern” mediation is not 
as common here as elsewhere, at least for “non-specialist” matters. 
 
Such use that has been made of mediation has been led by the construction industry (as it 
often has elsewhere). For example, mediation was employed to resolve many of the 
contentious issues that arose out of the construction of the Hong Kong International 
Airport in the 1990s15. In 1991, the Hong Kong government introduced a standard 
mediation clause in its General Conditions of Contract for certain types of public 
works16. In addition, the Hong Kong Mediation Council (“HKMC”) was established in 
1994 to promote the development and use of mediation17. Further, the Hong Kong 
Mediation Centre was created in 1999 by local “mediation advocates” to “practise, 
promote, develop and institutionalize mediation as 18 a way of life” . 
                                                
 
Yet, Hong Kong’s development of court-annexed mediation has been limited to pilot 
mediation schemes for construction claims, commercial disputes, family cases and – most 
 
11 See http://www.cedr.com/CEDR_Solve/services/mediation.php   
12 See http://www.cpradr.org/med_intro.asp?M=9.2.10  
13 See Cable & Wireless plc v IBM United Kingdom Limited [2002] 2 All ER 104  
14 See Bee Chen Goh, Law Without Lawyers, Justice Without Courts: On Traditional Chinese Mediation 
15 See http://www.pcicb.gov.hk/eng/meeting/download/p-PCICB-034-e.doc from the (now defunct) PCICB 
website and the General Conditions of Contract for the Airport Core Programme Civil Engineering Works  
16 See clause 86 of its General Conditions of Contract for Civil Engineering Works 
17 See http://www.hkiac.org/HKIAC/HKIAC_English/main.html  
18 See http://www.mediationcentre.com.hk/  
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recently – Lands Tribunal matters19. It is this perceived lack of progress that lies behind 
the government’s recent initiatives.  
 
1.3 Mediation and the Courts – the options  
 
The “push” for mediation in Hong Kong comes at the same time as the CJR programme 
is reaching fruition. It is anticipated that the “new” Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) will 
come into effect on 2 April 2009. The CJR draws heavily upon the English Civil 
Procedure Rules (“CPR”), especially in the area of case management. The Interim and 
Final Reports20 both addressed the relationship between ADR and the courts. Of 
particular interest was the attention given to compulsory mediation. 
 
The Interim Report observed that it would not be possible to compel parties to mediate as 
this would infringe Article 35 of the Basic Law, which grants Hong Kong residents the 
right of access to the courts21. Any “compulsory” ADR could only be introduced in 
conjunction with the option of going to court if ADR failed. Similar concerns have been 
raised in England, where it has been suggested that compulsory mediation infringes 
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)22.  
 
The Interim Report listed six options (the “Options”) for promoting ADR. Under them, 
ADR can be -  
 
A. made mandatory by a statutory or court rule for all cases in a defined class; 
B. made mandatory by an order issued at the court’s discretion in cases thought 
likely to benefit; 
C. made mandatory by one party electing for ADR; 
D. made a condition of getting legal aid in certain types of cases;  
E. voluntary but encouraged by the court, with unreasonable refusal or lack of 
cooperation running the risk of a costs sanction; or 
F. entirely voluntary, with the court limiting its role to encouragement and the 
provision of information and facilities23. 
 
From litigants’ point of view, there is little to choose between A and B whilst C and E are 
a halfway-house between compulsion and the freedom of choice embodied by F. Option 
D may have little bearing in some jurisdictions and may be considered unfair where it 
does. From the Secretary for Justice’s standpoint, the distinction is between Options A-B 
and Options E-F.  
                                                 
19 See note 3 above 
20 See http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk/index.html (the Final Report was published in March 2004) 
21 See http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/  Article 35 reads “Hong Kong residents shall have the 
right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of their 
lawful rights and interests or for representation in the courts, and to judicial remedies. Hong Kong residents 
shall have the right to institute legal proceedings in the courts against the acts of the executive authorities 
and their personnel.”  
22 See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/005.doc for the full text of the ECHR 
23 IR page 237, para 639 – the lettering A to F is the author’s 
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The Interim Report incorporated the Options as its Proposals 63 to 68 (i.e. Option A was 
Proposal 63 and so on) for consultation. The response, as indicated by the Final Report, 
was mixed24. Options A and C were rejected by the consultees; B, D and E received a 
mixed response; and F was generally supported. As a consequence, only Options D, E 
and F formed part of the Final Report’s Recommendations.  
 
Many commentators were disappointed by this limited set of Recommendations and were 
further displeased by their absence from both subsequent consultation documents and the 
Civil Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2008 that forms the statutory basis 
of the CJR25. This criticism may have been assuaged by the Government’s subsequent 
activity but the Secretary for Justice’s question of how to encourage mediation remains. 
The choices available remain – subject to a few minor caveats – Options A to F.   
 
2. COMPULSORY COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION IN OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS 
 
The paper now examines the choices of England26, Australia, Canada, the USA and 
Singapore. Other than their shared common law background, why choose these 
jurisdictions?  
 
First, as already noted, the new RHC draw heavily upon the English CPR. Second, 
Australia is a leading proponent of mandatory mediation, as is Canada. In addition, 
Canada is a mixed civil and common law country, as is Hong Kong (with the Chinese 
civil law system alongside the local common law system). The USA is where, many 
argue, ADR was “born”. Finally, Singapore is, like Hong Kong, one of Asia’s leading 
commercial centres.  
 
One further point is that this paper concentrates on court-annexed mediation in the 
principal courts of each jurisdiction. It is quite correct that all these jurisdictions operate a 
variety of “private” and other “public” mediation schemes but the focus here is on what 
the courts do. This part of the paper is also largely descriptive.  
 
2.1 England  
 
(i) The CPR 
 
The CPR replaced the separate High Court and County Court rules in April 1999. Their 
introduction followed Lord Woolf’s “Access to Justice” report27, which criticised the 
previous systems for being expensive, slow, uncertain and overly adversarial. The CPR 
were designed to overcome these failings by changing the culture - not just the 
procedures - of civil litigation.  
                                                 
24 Final Report (FR) pages 423 to 459. 
25 ADR Chambers (HK) Limited expressed its disappointment in a letter to the Legislative Council 
Secretariat of 5 June 2007.  
26 “England” is used rather than “England &Wales” to save space (with apologies to Welsh colleagues) 
27 See http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm  
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This desired cultural change is at its clearest in the “overriding objective” of CPR 1 
which is “of enabling the court to deal with cases justly”28. This overriding objective is 
central to the role that ADR plays in England. For example, by CPR 1.4(2)(e), the courts 
must further the overriding objective by “encouraging the parties to use [ADR] if the 
court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of [ADR]”. The courts have the 
power to adjourn hearings, stay proceedings and extend procedural timetables to 
“facilitate” such ADR29.   
 
ADR is also relevant to the question of costs. CPR 44.5(3)(a)(ii) states “The court must 
also have regard to… the efforts made, if any, before and during the proceedings in order 
to try to resolve the dispute” when awarding costs . Nor are the parties passive observers 
in this process given that CPR 1.3 establishes that they “are required to help the court to 
further the overriding objective”. 
 
The CPR is accompanied by nine pre-action protocols30. One of their objectives, as set 
out in paragraph 1.4(2) of the Practice Direction-Protocols – and in the protocols 
themselves - is “to enable parties to avoid litigation by agreeing a settlement of the claim 
before commencement of proceedings”. Paragraph 2A.1 of the Pre-Action Protocol for 
Disease and Illness Claims states -   
 
“The parties should consider whether some form of alternative dispute resolution 
procedure would be more suitable than litigation, and if so, endeavour to agree 
which form to adopt. Both the Claimant and Defendant may be required by the 
Court to provide evidence that alternative means of resolving their dispute were 
considered. The Courts take the view that litigation should be a last resort, and 
that claims should not be issued prematurely when a settlement is still actively 
being explored. Parties are warned that if the protocol is not followed (including 
this paragraph) then the Court must have regard to such conduct when 
determining costs”31 
 
Paragraph 2A.4, however, adds “It is expressly recognised that no party can or should be 
forced to mediate or enter into any form of ADR”. 
 
(ii) Individual Court initiatives 
 
Section G of the Commercial Court Guide emphasises the court’s “primary role” as a  
                                                 
28 CPR 1.1(2) continues “Dealing with cases justly includes, so far as is practicable – (a) ensuring the 
parties are on an equal footing; (b) saving expense; (c) dealing with the case in ways which are 
proportionate – (i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the 
complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the financial position of each party; (d) ensuring that it is dealt with 
expeditiously and fairly; and (e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking 
into account the need to allot resources to other cases. 
29 By CPR 26.4 the courts may order a month’s (or longer) stay for ADR 
30 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/menus/protocol.htm Their coverage includes Personal 
Injury, Defamation and Professional Negligence claims 
31 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/protocols/prot_dis.htm  
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forum for deciding claims whilst, at the same time, encourages ADR. Similarly, Chapter 
17 of the Chancery Guide, paragraph 6.6 of the Queen’s Bench Guide and Section 7 of 
the Technology & Construction Court Guide all address ADR32.  
 
In addition, the Central London County Court and other courts have operated mandatory 
mediation pilot schemes. The outcomes of these schemes are discussed later in the 
context of the advantages and disadvantages of compulsory mediation. 
 
(iii) Case law 
 
In Dunnett v Railtrack plc [2002] 2 All ER 850, one of the earliest decisions on the 
subject, the Court of Appeal deprived the successful defendant of its award for costs 
because it had had turned down the defeated plaintiff’s earlier offer to mediate – a 
decision which came as a shock to many at the time. In Halsey v Milton Keynes General 
NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576 it was reiterated that a winning party (at trial) could 
forfeit its costs award if the losing party demonstrated that its opponent had 
“unreasonably” refused to mediate. When deciding whether a party had acted 
unreasonably the court must remember the benefits of mediation over litigation and 
consider all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the dispute; the merits; 
the extent to which other settlement methods had been attempted; and whether mediation 
had a reasonable prospect of success.  
 
It can be seen then that, with the exception of the pilot schemes referred to above, 
England selected Option E.    
 
2.2 Australia 
 
The position in Australia is complicated by the fact that there are separate State and 
Federal Court systems. Having said that, the use of mediation is well developed across 
them all and, moreover, mandatory mediation is quite common. There follows a short 
summary of the approaches adopted by the three most populous States, together with the 
Federal approach. 
 
(i) New South Wales 
 
The New South Wales’ Courts Legislation (Mediation and Evaluation) Amendment Act 
1994 introduced a new section 110K to the Supreme Court Act 1970, giving courts the 
power to order mediation in appropriate circumstances with the parties’ consent. Thus, as 
at this stage, New South Wales chose Option F.  
 
This soon changed with the Supreme Court Amendment (Referral of Proceedings) Act 
2000 which permitted the courts to refer any civil proceedings to mediation without the 
parties’ consent. This leap to Option B can be explained, in part, by the appointment in 
1998 of Chief Justice James Spigelman AC, who has been a strong advocate of mediation 
for many years and whose views are shared throughout the State.  
                                                 
32 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/menus/court_guides.htm  
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The progress of compulsory mediation did not stop here. Section 26(1) of the Civil 
Procedure Act 200533 enhanced the regime – 
 
“If it considers the circumstances appropriate, the court may, by order, refer any 
proceedings before it, or part of any such proceedings, for mediation by a 
mediator, and may do so either with or without the consent of the parties to the 
proceedings concerned….” 
  
Section 27 adds “It is the duty of each party to proceedings that have been referred for 
mediation to participate, in good faith, in the mediation”. This paper will return to “good 
faith” later.  
 
Part 20 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, supplemented by Supreme Court 
Practice Note “No SC Gen 6 Mediation”, covers the nuts-and-bolts of referrals. The latter 
reiterates that courts can, at any stage, refer the parties to mediation without their consent 
if this appears “appropriate”. Having said that, the Practice Note adds “It is not the 
intention of the Court that mediation will be ordered in all proceedings”. It also mentions 
that the parties can agree on their mediator or, if they do not, the court may select 
someone; refer the matter to a registrar or court officer, who will meet the parties and 
report back on the case’s suitability for mediation; or decide against referring the dispute 
to mediation34.  
 
Thus, in contrast with England, New South Wales has chosen Option B. 
 
(ii) Victoria 
 
The “garden state” also has considerable experience of mediation. The Victoria Supreme 
Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 200535 contain detailed provisions on referrals to 
mediation. For this paper, the most significant is rule 50.07(1) which states that the court 
may “at any stage of a proceeding…with or without the consent of any party, order that 
the proceeding or any part of the proceeding be referred to a mediator”. In contrast with 
some jurisdictions the referral does not stay the proceedings unless the court orders 
otherwise.  
 
The mediator must “endeavour to assist the parties” in settling the proceedings or 
particular issues. He or she may also be required to make a report to the court when the 
mediation is completed. It is also possible, by rule 50.07.1 for a Master to mediate 
proceedings.  
  
Victoria has, like New South Wales, chosen Option B, albeit with different features. 
 
                                                 
33 See http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/cpa2005167/  
34 See http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_procedures  
35 See http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/  
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(iii) Queensland 
 
As with its neighbours to the south, the courts in Queensland have much experience of 
ADR and have also embraced compulsion. Section 95 of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland Act 199136 defines “ADR” as “a process of mediation or case appraisal 
under which the parties are helped to achieve an early, inexpensive settlement or 
resolution of their dispute”. Section 102(1) permits the court to “require the parties or 
their representatives to attend before it to enable the court to decide whether the parties’ 
dispute should be referred to an ADR process”. ADR processes include “case appraisal” 
and mediation. 
 
Section 103 is headed “Parties must attend at ADR process if Supreme Court orders” and 
the text reflects this. The parties “must attend before the ADR convenor appointed to 
conduct the ADR process” and “must not impede the ADR convenor”. The Supreme 
Court may impose sanctions on any malefactor including staying any claim for relief and 
taking his behaviour into account when awarding costs.   
 
Queensland’s Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 199937 set down how these statutory 
provisions operate in practice. The mediator has considerable control of the mediation. 
By rule 326(2) he decides whether a party may be represented at the mediation and, if so, 
by whom. His authority is reiterated in rule 325 which requires the parties to “assist” him 
by acting “reasonably and genuinely” in the mediation and rule 322 which defines when a 
party is deemed to “impede” the process by, for example, failing to attend.  Rule 321 
states that the proceedings are stayed until six business days after a report certifying the 
completion of the ADR is filed with the court registrar. 
 
It can be seen then that Queensland has also chosen Option B but with its own particular 
features. 
 
(iv) The Federal Courts and other States 
 
The Federal Court has had the power to refer matters to mediation without the consent of 
litigants since 199738. Section 53A(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (as 
amended) reads “Referrals…to a mediator may be made with or without the consent of 
the parties to the proceedings”. 
 
The conduct of court-annexed mediation is regulated by Order 72 of the Federal Court 
Rules, whilst Order 10 rule 1(2)(g) gives the court the power to refer a matter to 
mediation. Interestingly, the Federal Court Rules do not repeat section 53A’s provision 
that the court need not obtain the parties’ consent for a referral to mediation.  
 
Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania also have court-annexed mediation (or 
ADR) schemes which permit mandatory references over the objections of the parties.  
                                                 
36 See http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/S/SuprCrtQA91.pdf  
37 See http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/S/SuprCrtQUCPRu99.pdf  
38 See http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/  
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Once again, it can be seen that the Australian approach is to choose Option B. 
 
2.3 Canada 
 
Like Australia, Canada has a federal system albeit comprising Provinces, rather than 
States, and Territories. A further complication is that both English and French are official 
languages at the Federal level. Moreover, Quebec (the largest Province by area and its 
second largest by population) has a civil law rather than common law system – a feature 
of its French colonial origins. 
 
(i) The Federal Court 
 
The Federal Court’s rule 257 states that, within 60 days after the close of pleadings, the 
parties’ representatives should “discuss the possibility of settling any or all of the issues 
in the action” and apply to the court to “refer any unsettled issues to a dispute resolution 
conference”39.  
 
Rules 386 to 391, under the heading “Dispute Resolution Services” set out the details. 
The court may order any proceedings to be referred to a dispute resolution conference, 
which should be completed within 30 days of the referral. This conference may be 
conducted by a case management judge who may conduct a mediation; carry out an early 
neutral evaluation; or hold a mini-trial. The proceedings themselves may be stayed for up 
to six months whilst ADR is attempted.  
 
Option B is clearly the choice here. 
 
(ii) Ontario 
 
Cases in the Superior Court of Justice are governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure40. 
Rule 24.1 is entitled “Mandatory Mediation” and its purpose is “to reduce cost and delay 
in litigation and facilitate the early and fair resolution of disputes”. The rule has a varied 
application across the Province as, for example, it covers actions commenced in Toronto 
from January 4, 1999 but those commenced in Ottawa-Carleton only between January 4 
and December 31, 1999. There are also several exceptions to the rule, such as actions that 
were mediated “under section 258.6 of the Insurance Act” less than a year before “the 
delivery of the first defence”. Parties may also apply to exempt their claim from the rule. 
 
According to rule 24.1.09(1) mediation is generally expected to take place within 90 days 
of the defence being filed. The parties may choose a mediator or one may be assigned for 
them. Rule 24.1 also prescribes the steps leading up to the mediation, including the 
preparation and service by each party of a statement of issues. The parties (and their 
lawyers) are “required to attend the mediation session”, as is a representative of any 
insurer involved in the matter (i.e. if that insurer is indemnifying a party). It is expected 
                                                 
39 See http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cr/SOR-98-106//?showtoc=&instrumentnumber=SOR-98-106  
40 See http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws_regs_900194_e.htm  
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that those in attendance will have authority to settle or have “ready telephone access” to 
someone who does. 
 
If a party does not attend the mediation within 30 minutes of its start, the mediator 
cancels the session and files a “certificate of non-compliance” with the court. The court 
may then impose various sanctions, up to dismissing the claim or striking out the defence. 
If the mediation succeeds, the agreement is recorded in writing. If a party subsequently 
breaches the settlement’s terms, any other party may apply to the court for judgment in its 
terms or continue the claim on the basis that there was no agreement.  
 
Here, the choice is Option A or a very strong form of Option B. 
 
(iii)  British Columbia 
 
The Supreme Court of British Columbia41 operates a “Notice to Mediate” process, which 
differs from the Federal and Ontario schemes in that the requirement to mediate is 
initiated by a party to the action. It was first introduced for motor vehicle actions in April 
1998 and extended to cover the majority of Supreme Court actions by the Notice to 
Mediate (General) Regulation in February 2001. 
 
A party’s Notice can only be served between 60 days after the filing of the defence and 
120 days before trial, unless the court orders otherwise. There are a limited number of 
exemptions to the Notice’s compulsion to attend mediation, such as when all parties have 
already participated in a mediation. A party may also apply to adjourn a mediation which, 
in its view, has been sought prematurely. Also, a Notice can only be used once in relation 
to a claim, unless the court orders otherwise.  
 
The parties must agree who is to act as mediator and the mediation must take place within 
60 days of his appointment. If the parties cannot agree, a mediator may be appointed for 
them by the British Columbia Mediator Roster Society42. If a party refuses to attend the 
mediation, any other party may file an “Allegation of Default” and apply to the court for 
an order that the claim be stayed until the defaulting party attends the mediation and that 
the miscreant also be penalised in costs. 
 
British Columbia has therefore chosen option C. 
 
(iv) Quebec 
 
The Quebec courts operate on the civil law basis. They have also developed a particular 
form of court-annexed mediation. Article 4.3 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure43 
states -  
 
                                                 
41 See http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/index.htm  
42 See http://www.mediator-roster.bc.ca/  
43 See http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/c-25/20050809/whole.html  
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“The courts and judges may attempt to reconcile the parties, if they consent, in 
any matter except a matter relating to personal status or capacity or involving 
public policy issues. In family matters or matters involving small claims, it is the 
judge's duty to attempt to reconcile the parties.” 
 
Articles 151.14 to 151.23 of the Code set out the provisions of what is referred to as “an 
amicable dispute resolution conference”. There are also “Operating Rules” to assist the 
parties and their legal advisers44. By Article 151.16 the aim of this conference is “to 
facilitate dialogue between the parties and help them to identify their interests, assess 
their positions, negotiate and explore mutually satisfactory solutions”.   
 
The chief justice or chief judge may, on his own initiative or upon the parties’ request, 
order such a conference. He will also designate a judge to preside over it. If the parties 
have requested the conference, their request must contain “a summary of the questions at 
issue”45. The conference is private; free of charge; and informal. It may be attended by 
the parties, their legal advisers and third parties (i.e. experts) “if the judge and the parties 
consider that their presence would be helpful in resolving the dispute”. 
 
The judge presiding over the conference is responsible for setting down its “rules” and 
agenda, in conjunction with the parties. He may also “modify” the procedural timetable, 
albeit there is no stay.  As with the Ontario process, Quebec’s requires the parties to 
ensure “that the persons who have authority to conclude an agreement are present at the 
settlement conference” or that such persons may be contacted at “at all times” to provide 
their consent. 
 
If the conference achieves a settlement, the judge can be asked to sanction its terms. If, 
however, the conference is unsuccessful, the judge will be excluded from any 
involvement in the proceedings thereafter (i.e. trial).  
 
It can be seen, then, that Quebec has chosen option F. 
 
2.4 USA 
 
As with Australia and Canada, but on a much larger scale, the USA has both State and 
Federal courts. As with Canada, the USA is also predominantly a common law 
jurisdiction whilst possessing – in Louisiana – a civil jurisdiction. Given the scale and 
complexity of the USA, it would be futile to summarise its numerous forms of ADR here. 
Suffice it to say, most of the familiar methods of ADR are used and, often, were 
developed in the USA. 
 
The US Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 1998 requires the US Federal District Courts 
to provide ADR services to parties. Mediation is the most popular form of ADR, as 
elsewhere. A summary in 2005 by the Federal Judicial Center in 49 District Courts 
                                                 
44See http://www.tribunaux.qc.ca/mjq_en/c-
quebec/Modes_alternatifs_de_reglement_anglais/fs_CRAcivil_FonctionnementAng.html  
45 The request specifically provides for all parties’ consent 
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revealed that 15,555 cases were referred to mediation out of 24,835 cases that involved 
some form of ADR46. Despite the fact that the District Courts apply the same federal 
laws, they have a variety of approaches to mediation. For example, mediation is 
mandatory in the Western District of Washington (the State, not the US capital) under 
Local Civil Rule 39.147 but this is not the “default” position. 
 
At State level, there is a multiplicity of approaches not only between States but among 
the courts in any one State. Such is the variety that no one (as of yet) has been able to 
compile a national review of the types of ADR used, let alone their success rates. This 
remains the case despite the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State 
Laws’ (“NCCUSL”) Uniform Mediation Act48. 
 
The US Federal and State courts have chosen almost all the Options A to F.  
 
2.5 Singapore 
 
The Singapore Supreme Court consists of the Court of Appeal and High Court, with the 
Subordinate Courts consisting of the District Court and the Magistrate's Court. The High 
Court is the court of first instance, generally for claims beyond the Subordinate Courts’ 
jurisdiction. 
 
In 1994, the Subordinate Courts began operating Court Dispute Resolution (“CDR”). 
This, in the words of the Subordinate Court’s website is “a voluntary settlement process 
by which the parties reach a satisfactory solution with the aid of a neutral third person, 
the Settlement Judge”49. CDR involves the parties (and their lawyers) attending a 
settlement conference, which is presided over by “an experienced and impartial 
Settlement Judge”. The Subordinate Courts Practice Directions state that conferences 
may be convened by the court on its own initiative or upon any party’s request. They also 
suggest that, in order to achieve the best result, conferences should not take place before 
the close of pleadings50.  
 
The parties submit an opening statement in advance and are “expected to be thoroughly 
prepared to discuss their respective cases” at the conference. Expert witnesses may also 
attend if this is deemed necessary. The aim is “to encourage litigants and solicitors to 
negotiate freely before the Settlement Judge”. If the parties are unable to resolve their 
dispute, the judge will order the necessary directions for trial and then play no further part 
in the proceedings. In response to the question “Is attendance at the CDR by the parties 
required?” the website states “Yes, if party is not represented by lawyer. If they are 
represented by lawyers, their attendance will be dependent on the advice of their lawyers 
or upon direction by the Settlement Judge”.   
                                                 
46 See “In Resolving Disputes, Mediation Most Favored ADR Option in District Courts”, Newsletter of the 
Federal Courts Vol. 38, Number 7 (July 2006) 
47 See http://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/CourtServices/AlternativeDisputeResolution.htm  
48 See http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/UMA2001.htm  
49 See http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/subcourts/page.aspx?pageid=4419 
50 See http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/Master%20PD%20(20.3.08).pdf  
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The Practice Directions also provide for pre-trial conferences (PTCs) in District Court 
actions involving claims over $100,000. Legal advisers must ensure that their clients are 
fully informed about the possibility of using ADR prior to the PTC. If the parties agree at 
the PTC to mediation at the Singapore Mediation Centre51, the matter will be so referred.  
 
PTCs are also held in Supreme Court matters52. The court’s powers here are 
considerable. Order 34A rule 2(2) states –  
                                                
 
“the Court may consider any matter including the possibility of settlement of all 
or any of the issues in the action or proceedings and require the parties to furnish 
the Court with any such information as it thinks fit, and may also give all such 
directions as appear to be necessary or desirable for securing the just, expeditious 
and economical disposal of the action or proceedings”.  
 
Such information and discussions will not, however, be made known to the court 
conducting the trial if the matter proceeds. Parties who settle at a PTC may have their 
agreement recorded before the registrar. If the matter cannot be resolved, a trial date will 
be arranged instead.  
 
Singapore has therefore chosen Option B. 
 
3. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF COMPULSION  
 
Even this brief survey reveals a divergence of approaches to promoting mediation. 
Ontario and New South Wales sit at one end of the scale, choosing “compulsion” in the 
form of Options A and B, whilst England and Quebec choose the “encouragement” of 
Options E and F. There are, of course, varieties of “compulsion” and “encouragement”. It 
is also true that the “compulsion” courts often exercise their discretion not to order 
mediation. In addition, there is the distinction between mediation which is carried out 
“privately”, as in Ontario, and that which is presided over by a judge, as in Quebec.  
 
These differences, even among those who apparently chose the same Option, reflect 
different cultural and legal traditions and demonstrate that there is no single “right” 
answer to the question of whether Hong Kong should compel mediation. This may come 
as a revelation to those who are, perhaps, unnecessarily dogmatic in their adherence to 
compulsion53.  
 
So, if there is no clear Option for Hong Kong, what course should it take? The answer to 
that question actually depends on the answers to three further questions. What are the 
 
51 See http://www.mediation.com.sg/  
52 See http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=1  
53 The author has attended ADR conferences whereat least one speaker (often a lawyer) has expressed the 
view that parties should accept mandatory mediation because they didn’t know (whereas lawyers did) what 
was “good for them”! 
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qualities of mediation? What are the aims of mediation? Is compulsion compatible with 
those qualities and aims?  
 
These questions and their answers, which very much depend on one’s point of view, have 
determined which Options have been selected elsewhere and why.  Finally, before 
proceeding further, it is important to appreciate that these questions are distinct from 
what tends to be the main preoccupation of those interested in mediation - its advantages 
and disadvantages when compared to litigation.  
 
3.1 The qualities of mediation 
 
According to Ruth Charlton54 mediation has five qualities or “philosophies” – 
 
1. Confidentiality 
2. Voluntariness 
3. Empowerment 
4. Neutrality 
5. The provision of unique solutions 
 
“Confidentiality”, in that the parties’ oral statements and written documents are protected 
from future collateral use or disclosure, is widely acknowledged to be one of the major 
“selling points” of mediation over litigation. “Voluntariness” reflects the fact that the 
parties attend mediations because they have made a positive choice to do so. This quality, 
as with “Empowerment”, is reflected in the words “with the parties in ultimate control of 
the decision to settle and the terms of resolution” in CEDR’s definition of mediation.  
 
The “Neutrality” is that of the mediator, who merely facilitates the parties’ attempts to 
reach a settlement and does not pass judgment on the parties, their cases or the terms of 
the settlement (unless he is a “conciliator”). Finally, mediation offers the parties the 
ability to “solve” their dispute in “Unique” ways beyond paying damages. This can be 
especially important when the parties wish to maintain an ongoing business relationship. 
 
Many other experts, including David Spencer and Michael Brogan55, share this 
interpretation of mediation and it is, accordingly, adopted here also. 
 
3.2 The aims of mediation 
 
The aims of mediation (and their relative importance) depend on one’s point of view. 
Perhaps the first aim is for a more efficient process for resolving disputes which – unlike 
litigation - is not dogged by delay, excessive cost, uncertainty and hostility between the 
parties (and their lawyers)56. This allows the parties to get on with their lives57 and 
                                                 
54See Charlton, R. 2000. Dispute Resolution Guidebook and Charlton, R. & Dewdney, M. 2004. The 
Mediator’s Handbook. Skills and Strategies for Practitioners. (2nd edition) 
55 See Spencer, D & Brogan, M Mediation Law and Practice 
56 Some of the faults observed by Lord Woolf in “Access to Justice”  
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reduces the workload of court administrative staff and the judiciary. Another benefit is 
the freeing up of court time for other disputes. Hence, this aim also encompasses 
increasing “access to justice” as envisaged by the proponents of the “third wave” of legal 
reform. This first aim, then, is one that can be appreciated by parties, lawyers, courts and 
the governments that run and fund the courts. 
 
A second aim of mediation is to increase the “power” of the parties. Many writers, 
including Albert Fiadjoe, have referred to an “ADR spectrum” with negotiations at one 
end and litigation at the other58. This spectrum can be represented in the following way – 
 
Negotiation – Mediation – Expert determination – Mini-trial – Arbitration - Litigation 
 
This is a very simplified version of the spectrum as it does not include every form of 
ADR but the concept is clear. An ADR technique’s place in this spectrum depends upon 
who has power over it; its formalities; whether it is public or private; and its outcome. In 
negotiation, the parties have pretty much unlimited power in a process which can be as 
informal as a private telephone call where the parties reach (or decide not to reach) a 
“deal” about their dispute. Moreover, the parties are not limited – in the way that the 
courts are – on the form of this “deal” (provided it is not unlawful)59. This aim reflects 
the qualities of mediation set out above and is clearly one which appeals to the parties, 
especially businesses and industry groups that would rather avoid the proverbial public 
“washing of dirty laundry” (i.e. professionals facing negligence claims from disgruntled 
clients). It is not one, beyond a concern for fair and lawful outcomes, in which the courts 
may be interested. 
 
A third aim is called “transformation”60. This has two aspects. The first is the 
transformation of the dynamics of the dispute itself in that the parties move from focusing 
on their narrow self-interests to their shared relationship (and the mutual benefits 
thereof). The second aspect is a wider “social transformation’ in which communities - 
geographical, social, economic or ethnic - take control of resolving their disputes from 
the courts. This aim of mediation is, arguably, the province of politicians and 
sociologists. It is also more appropriate to disputes between, for example, family 
members or employers and employees than to, say, personal injury claims arising from 
road traffic accidents in which the parties have no “relationship” outside the events 
giving rise to the dispute.     
 
Whilst there is scope for argument over the exact number of aims and the distinctions 
between them61, it is submitted that those set out above are comprehensive. What is more 
problematical is the priority given to them. This is determined by the attitudes and 
influence of those concerned. Prescience is not required to appreciate that courts may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
57 The “cost” to parties is not just the fees paid but the “downtime” spent meeting lawyers; in 
correspondence; and attending court. 
58 Fiadjoe, A Alternative Dispute Resolution:Developing a World Perspective 
59 Common law jurisdictions provide for injunctions and specific performance but these tend to be 
exceptional rather than commonplace outcomes of litigation  
60 See note 10 – Global Trends at page 11 
61 See note 10 – Global Trends at pages 9-12. Alexander refers to six 
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more interested in eliminating trial backlogs than in litigants’ “happiness” at ending their 
disputes at trial or mediation. Such distinctions explain why Options A and B have as 
many (perhaps more) supporters as Options E and F.  
 
3.3 Compatibility 
 
Is compulsory mediation, in the form of Options A and B, compatible with these qualities 
and aims?  
 
Starting with the qualities of mediation (and the second of the three aims), it would 
appear – at first sight - that the confidentiality of a mediation session is disturbed if it is 
ordered by the court and destroyed if it is actually presided over by a judge. Given that 
the purpose of this confidentiality is to encourage open discussions leading to settlement 
(on the “without prejudice” basis), its partial or complete removal damages the efficiency 
of the mediation process. Whilst some compulsory mediation schemes seek to obviate 
this problem by preventing a judge/mediator from having any further involvement in a 
matter, others take a contrary path. As has already been noted, the Victoria courts may 
order a mediator to file a report on a mediation session. This sits uneasily with the 
confidentiality terms in most voluntary mediation agreements and the statutory 
protections on mediation confidentiality in some jurisdictions62. All the Options, save F, 
could be said to be incompatible with this quality.  
  
What of “voluntariness” and “empowerment”? Clearly someone who attends mediation 
under order is not a “volunteer”. Does this matter? Some commentators have written of 
importance of the “willingness factor” in mediation63. This desire to attend mediation and 
reach a settlement is, it is claimed, crucial to a successful outcome. Further, almost all the 
literature on mediation stresses the importance to success of building trust between the 
parties and between the parties and the mediator. A party that is obliged to attend 
mediation may not only do so without this desire to settle but, in some situations, may 
resent both the process and the other attendees. This has been recognised by courts in 
“compulsion” jurisdictions, for example in Morrow v chinadotcom [2001] NSWSC 209, 
Barrett J observed – 
 
“The present proceedings involve commercial parties engaged in a commercial 
transaction. They may be taken to possess a reasonable degree of business 
sophistication and acumen…If, with the benefit of [the knowledge of ADR] and 
the advice of their solicitors, they do not see sufficient value in resort to [ADR] 
there is, it seems to me, very little, if anything, that is likely to be gained by the 
Court compelling them to pay lip service to it”  
 
Barett J’s views, expressed before the New South Wales courts obtained the power to 
mandate mediation, were not shared by his colleague Hamilton J in the subsequent case 
of Remuneration  Planning Corp Pty Ltd v  Fitton [2001] NSWSC 1208 - 
 
                                                 
62 The UMA’s main concern is confidentiality 
63 See note 55 - Mediation Law and Practice at page 267 
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“It has become plain that there are circumstances in which parties insist on taking 
the stance that they will not go to mediation, perhaps from a fear that to show 
willingness to do so may appear a sign of weakness, yet engage in successful 
mediation when mediation is ordered.” 
 
Chief Justice Spigelman agrees –  
 
“One matter that appears somewhat counter intuitive is the conferral upon courts 
of a power to order mediation. This was once thought to be pointless because it 
appeared unlikely that a party who was ordered to mediate would be prepared to 
enter such negotiations in a co-operative manner. That has proven to be false. 
Reluctant starters have often proved to be willing participants in the negotiation 
process.”64 
 
The message, at least from New South Wales, seems to be that voluntariness and party 
empowerment are only justified when they lead to mediation and, if they do not, they 
should be sacrificed in the name of efficiency. This view is not confined to New South 
Wales, given that Lightman J has argued for increased English court pressure on parties 
to mediate on the basis that it works elsewhere65. This is the essence of the creed of those 
who back Options A and B, and the view rejected by those who back E (to some extent) 
and F.  
 
One way of encouraging “reluctant starters” to take mediation seriously has been to 
require parties to participate in “good faith” or not “impede” the mediation. In Modern 
Merchandising P/L v Brown & Anor [1998] QSC 69 the Queensland Supreme Court 
utilised section 103 of the of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 to stay a 
defendant’s counterclaim as it had not attended a case appraisal. In Laporte v. Ridgewell, 
2007 CanLII 2805, the Superior Court in Ontario ordered the defendants to pay the 
mediator’s fee and the plaintiff’s costs for a mediation session which they failed to attend 
(they were also ordered to attend a rescheduled session).  
 
Whilst good faith and trust are crucial to the success of mediation, it is questionable 
whether it can be engendered by court order. There is also the problem of distinguishing 
between “bad faith” and adopting a robust negotiating stance – when does a refusal to 
accept what one perceives to be a poor offer from the other side become a refusal to 
participate in the mediation? Moreover, the combination of mandatory mediations and 
“good faith” provisions could pressure some parties, especially unrepresented litigants, 
into accepting poor settlements66.  
 
Such “good faith” provisions also threaten the confidentiality and neutrality of the 
mediation. Who, for example, is to report the parties’ lack of faith to the court? Who else 
but the mediator in the form of, for example, an Ontario certificate of non-compliance. 
The mediator may, therefore, be a “snitch” or “tell-tale” in the eyes of the parties…and 
                                                 
64 See http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_spigelman091007  
65 http://www.adrgroup.co.uk/voice/documents/JusticeLightman.pdf  
66 See note 55 - Mediation Law and Practice at pages266-267 
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no one trusts a snitch67.  Once again, aspects of Options A and B sit uneasily with the 
aims of mediation. Indeed, such is the debate over whether US courts should be able to 
penalise parties for “bad faith” in court-annexed mediation that the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) prepared the following resolution – 
 
1. Sanctions should be imposed only for violations of rules specifying 
objectively-determinable conduct.    
2. The content of mediators’ reports to the court or court administrators should 
be narrowly restricted. 
3. Court-mandated mediation programs should engage in collaborative planning 
efforts and establish educational programs about mediation procedures for 
participants68 
 
Finally, do compulsory mediations lead to less-creative solutions? There is no reason to 
think that they do per se but one of the great selling points of mediation is the fact that 
mediators do not necessarily need to be lawyers. They can, instead, be members of other 
professions which may assist when the dispute relates to technical matters. A 
judge/mediator may lack such technical expertise and therefore the ability to help the 
parties come up with “creative” solutions to their impasse69.      
 
So, should Hong Kong reject compulsory mediation? Perhaps, but it is worth recalling 
the other side of the argument. Advocates of compulsory mediation, as has been seen, 
assert that it eliminates the fear that a party may look “weak” for proposing mediation to 
its opponent. They also maintain that it is mediation that is mandatory, not settlement, 
and therefore parties may still proceed to trial if they wish70. It is also much better than 
voluntary mediation at both promoting efficient dispute resolution and educating parties 
(and their lawyers) about the benefits of mediation and settlement71. The first point seems 
to be at variance with both the growth of voluntary mediation and the peculiarly common 
observation that over 90% of cases in almost all jurisdictions settle – lots of people must 
be willing to look “weak” by suggesting mediation or settlement! The second point 
overlooks the difficulties caused by “good faith” clauses. What of the third? Does the 
evidence demonstrate that mandatory mediations increase the efficiency of dispute 
resolution?  
 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales’ Annual Review for 200672 records that 64% of  
court-annexed mediations settled (at mediation) in 2002, rising to 67% in 2004 and 
falling to 58% in 2006. Why the decline? The Reviews do not record “private” 
mediations so perhaps only the most recalcitrant litigants are being dealt with by the 
                                                 
67 See Boettger, U Efficiency Versus Party Empowerment-Against A Good-Faith Requirement In 
Mandatory Mediation (The Review of Litigation) 
68 See http://www.abanet.org/dispute/webpolicy.html  
69 An ABA resolution for non-lawyers to be eligible to act as “neutrals” was passed in 1999, see 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/webpolicy.html#connected . CEDR’s mediators include HR directors and 
architects, see http://www.cedr.com/conflict/people/  
70 One of Lightman J’s points in his speech at note 65 above 
71 See Adams, GW Mediating Justice: Legal Dispute Negotiations at page 256 
72 See http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_annrev  
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courts. If so, then perhaps the number of litigants who have not accepted the benefits of 
ADR is not as great as feared. 
 
The Supreme Court of Queensland’s 2005-06 Annual Report73 records 126 consent 
orders to ADR by the parties and 212 mediation orders by the court (with 86 without the 
consent of at least one party). In terms of settlement, 239 claims were certified as settled 
at mediation and 133 as not settled (a 64% settlement rate).    
 
An independent evaluation of Ontario’s rule 24.1 was carried soon after its adoption74. In 
1999-2001, 2,500 Ottawa and 3,000 Toronto cases were referred to mediation (there were 
fewer than 100 exemptions). It was reported that mandatory mediation had reduced the 
time taken to dispose of cases; cut costs; and produced widespread satisfaction among 
parties and lawyers. Yet, it should also be recalled that only 41% of Ottawa mediations 
and 38% of Toronto mediations produced a settlement at or within 7 days of the session. 
It is also worth noting that Toronto amended its case management Practice Directions in 
2005 because both court waiting times and costs were growing75. Mandatory mediations 
were retained but their time limits extended76.  
 
In England, the Exeter, Manchester and Reading County Courts conducted compulsory 
mediation pilot schemes for small claims (i.e. beneath £5000) from June 2005 to May 
2006. In Exeter, 34% of cases were referred to mediation, although only 53% actually 
mediated and - of these - 65% settled (N.B. parties were allowed to withdraw from the 
mediation after referral following Halsey). In Manchester, 27% of all small claims were 
referred in the first six months of the scheme, of which 41% were actually mediated with 
an impressive 86% settlement rate. In Reading, 204 cases were referred, of which just 49 
(25%) settled. All the schemes, however, reported a reduction in judicial workloads77. 
 
One of the most recent – and comprehensive - research reports on court-annexed 
mediation is “Twisting arms: court referred and court linked mediation under judicial 
pressure” by Professor Dame Hazel Genn on behalf of the UK Ministry of Justice78. 
From April 2004 to March 2005, the Central London County Court (“CLCC”) ran an 
Automatic Referral to Mediation (“ARM”) pilot scheme which randomly referred cases 
to mediation with judges having the power to override the parties’ objections79. 
“Twisting Arms” explored the consequences of operating this “Ontario” style scheme in 
London. 
court actually received a reply to its referral notice). The settlement rate declined from 
                                                
 
A total of 1,232 cases were referred to mediation, of which only 14% of were mediated 
by the scheme’s end. Objections to mediation were raised in 81% of the cases (where the 
 
73 See http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/1340.htm   The 2006-07 report is silent on this matter.   
74 See http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/manmed/eval_committee.pdf  
75 See Jacobs, P A Recent Comparative History Of Mandatory Mediation Vs Voluntary Mediation In 
Ontario, Canada (IBA Mediation Newsletter, April 2005) 
76 See http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/scj/en/notices/pd/toronto/casemanagement.htm  
77 See http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/adr/index.htm#4  
78 See http://www.adrgroup.co.uk/voice/documents/ADRg%20Twisting-arms_full[1].pdf  
79 The CLCC has operated a voluntary scheme since 1996 
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69% in May 2004 to 38% in March 200580. Within this overall percentage, the rate was 
55% where both parties consented to mediation but only 48% where they had objected. 
The report also noted that the majority of cases in the ARM scheme actually settled 
without mediation. Another interesting point is that 72 cases were mediated under the 
court’s voluntary scheme in 1999, whilst 293 were mediated in 2004, following the 
decision in Dunnett v Railtrack. Unfortunately, the settlement rate fell from 62% to 45% 
over the same period81.  
 
These figures, especially those from the CLCC, are worth comparing to those in CEDR’s 
third mediation audit published in November 2007. CEDR projected that the English 
“civil and commercial mediation market” was 3,400 to 3,700 cases per annum. Further, 
those mediators who participated in the audit reported that 75% of their cases settled on 
the day of the mediation, with a further 13% settling shortly thereafter, giving an 
aggregate settlement rate of 88%82. These mediations were, of course, predominantly 
voluntary. Their performance outstrips almost all the compulsory schemes. 
 
There are – of course – lies, damned lies and statistics but the evidence appears to be that 
mandatory mediation does not encourage the settlement of disputes, only the number of 
mediations. In accountancy terms, turnover is improved but at the sake of profitability. 
Does this matter if the overall number of settlements increases - as it may if all cases 
have to mediate with stringent good faith clauses? This rather depends on one’s view not 
only of the objectives and aims of mediation but of the courts themselves.   
 
There is also one other vital factor. A settlement or judgment is not necessary the last 
chapter of a dispute. One analysis of US cases has suggested that parties are much more 
likely to need the courts to enforce agreements reached at mandatory mediations than 
those which resulted from voluntary mediations83. Returning to the accountancy analogy, 
increased turnover is of little value if it is accompanied by additional transaction costs. 
 
4. WHAT LESSONS THE HONG KONG EXPERIENCE MAY HAVE FOR 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS IN THE REGION 
 
We return then to the choice identified by the Secretary for Justice – compulsion or 
encouragement. It could be argued that any informed choice should be left until the 
various pilot schemes have run their course. It is worth noting at this juncture, however, 
that the Legal Aid Department has already reported that making mandatory mediation a 
pre-condition of legal aid “would not serve to promote the use” of the Family Mediation 
Service84. 
 
                                                 
80 This is attributed to Halsey in part 
81 See http://www.adrnow.org.uk/go/SubPage_134.html;jsessionid=a4SSN7_ytdv-  
82 See http://www.cedr.com/gfx/TheMediationAudit2007.pdf  
83 See Weisberg AN, The Secret to Success: An Examination of New York State Mediation Related 
Litigation, Fordham Ub LJ Vol XXXIV 
84 Report of the Hong Kong Legal Aid Department for the 28th Meeting of the Steering Committee on 
Family Mediation 
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In the meantime, one is left with Genn’s conclusion that “Facilitation and encouragement 
[of mediation] together with selective and appropriate pressure are likely to be more 
effective and possibly more efficient than blanket coercion to mediate”85. This favours 
Options E and F. Advocates of compulsory mediation, in the form of A or B, need to 
produce better evidence than that which is already available to counter this finding and, 
moreover, demonstrate that any efficiency gains outweigh the reduction of litigants’ 
freedoms. 
 
In the absence of such evidence, a sensible interim course would combine education and 
encouragement. Education should be for the judiciary, lawyers, business community and 
wider public. Chief Justice Li has called for ADR to be a compulsory part of the 
professional courses leading to qualification as a solicitor or barrister in Hong Kong86 – 
why stop there? Why not introduce ADR into business degree courses and training for 
other professions i.e. insurers, or even at school level? The HKMC and Hong Kong 
Mediation Centre could play an important role in such work. 
 
On the “encouragement” side, the courts could require the parties to confirm in writing 
that they had considered ADR and, if appropriate, explain why they had rejected it. This 
should be by a letter signed by the party, rather than by a standard form, and could 
include an acknowledgment of the potential costs savings of mediation together with a 
statement of the current and projected costs of the case, which would concentrate minds. 
The courts could require such letters more than once e.g. at the close of pleadings and at 
immediately before trial, and stay the proceedings pending their receipt. Such letters, as 
with Singapore PTC discussions, could be kept out of the trial bundles - but could and 
should be considered when costs awards are made. 
 
Finally, CPR-style cost sanctions should be available. This paper has not questioned the 
benefits of mediation, only the benefits of compulsory mediation. If parties are free to 
choose their own course of action, they must take responsibility for their choices and bear 
the costs of the same. The virtue of such sanctions is that they can be imposed on a case-
by-case basis. Further, since Halsey, the rationale for such sanctions has been generally 
accepted. 
 
Such a programme of action in Hong Kong - a jurisdiction which, hitherto, had only a 
“narrow” experience of mediation - could provide valuable information on the 
effectiveness of mediation; its relationship with litigation; and on promoting public 
awareness of legal issues. It could and should be built upon when the pilot schemes are 
concluded and their results analysed. This would benefit all those interested in tackling 
the difficulties which have led to the rise of mediation over the last thirty years. 
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